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Holistic coding for faces is shown in several illusions that demonstrate integration of the
percept across the entire face. The illusions occur upright but, crucially, not inverted. Con-
verting the illusions into experimental tasks that measure their strength – and thus index
degree of holistic coding – is often considered straightforward yet in fact relies on a hid-
den assumption, namely that there is no contribution to the experimental measure from
secondary cognitive factors. For the composite effect, a relevant secondary factor is size
of the “spotlight” of visuospatial attention.The composite task assumes this spotlight can
be easily restricted to the target half (e.g., top-half) of the compound face stimulus. Yet, if
this assumption were not true then a large spotlight, in the absence of holistic perception,
could produce a false composite effect, present even for inverted faces and contributing
partially to the score for upright faces.We review evidence that various factors can influence
spotlight size: race/culture (Asians often prefer a more global distribution of attention than
Caucasians); sex (females can be more global); appearance of the join or gap between face
halves; and location of the eyes, which typically attract attention. Results from five exper-
iments then show inverted faces can sometimes produce large false composite effects,
and imply that whether this happens or not depends on complex interactions between
causal factors. We also report, for both identity and expression, that only top-half face
targets (containing eyes) produce valid composite measures. A sixth experiment demon-
strates an example of a false inverted part-whole effect, where encoding-specificity is the
secondary cognitive factor. We conclude the inverted face control should be tested in all
composite and part-whole studies, and an effect for upright faces should be interpreted
as a pure measure of holistic processing only when the experimental design produces no
effect inverted.
Keywords: face perception, inversion effects, holistic processing, composite task, part-whole task, culture
differences, attention, global-local
INTRODUCTION
It is well established that there is a type of perceptual integra-
tion across the entire face that occurs for upright and not inverted
faces. This is referred to by face researchers as holistic coding. In the
present methodological article, we demonstrate the importance of
always running the inverted face control in any studies that aim to
assess holistic coding for upright faces. We argue a set of results
for upright faces can only be taken as a pure measure of holistic
coding where the corresponding effect for inverted faces is zero.
We show that while this is typically the case, it is not always. More-
over, we show that the circumstances where significant effects are
obtained for inverted faces are not simple to understand, and seem
likely to reflect a complex interaction of factors including proper-
ties of the participant, and properties of the stimuli or design. We
conclude, therefore, that all studies attempting to measure holistic
coding need to run the inverted control, and ideally confirm that
the effect of interest is absent inverted.
DEFINITION OF HOLISTIC CODING
Following classic papers in the field (e.g., Yin, 1969; Young et al.,
1987; Tanaka and Farah, 1993; Maurer et al., 2002) as well as recent
critical reviews (McKone and Yovel, 2009; Rossion, submitted) we
define holistic coding for faces as a very strong perceptual integra-
tion across the face in which (a) the face forms a gestalt in which
the appearance of the whole is more than the sum of the parts (e.g.,
altering the appearance of one facial region can strikingly affect
the percept of other regions and of the whole face), (b) all aspects
of facial information are included (e.g., feature shape and color,
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and distances between features or more likely microfeatures, see
McKone and Yovel, 2009), (c) all regions of the face are perceived
simultaneously1. There is no exact theory of what holistic coding
comprises in the literature, but it is established to be “special” to
faces (e.g., not occurring for other objects; McKone and Robbins,
2011).
There is much evidence that holistic coding is perceptual, and
not, say, attentional or decisional. Most importantly, holistic cod-
ing is demonstrated in three classic face illusions (Figure 1), all of
which demonstrate the critical property that “altering the appear-
ance of one facial region can strikingly affect the percept of other
regions and of the whole face.” In the Thatcher illusion (Thomp-
son, 1980), flipping the eyes and mouth makes the face appear
bizarre. In the composite illusion (Young et al., 1987), aligning
the top-half of one person’s face with the bottom-half of a dif-
ferent person creates the illusion that the top-half has altered in
appearance, and that the two halves have integrated to form a new
facial identity. And, in the part-whole illusion (Tanaka and Farah,
1993), the appearance of a single face feature (e.g., the mouth)
changes depending on the facial context into which that feature is
inserted.
In further confirmation of perceptual origin, the composite
illusion is associated with activity in a posterior (i.e., perceptual)
face area (the Fusiform Face Area, Schiltz and Rossion, 2006), and
in ERP is observed only 170 ms after stimulus onset (i.e., too fast
for a post-perceptual origin; Kuefner et al., 2010a). Also, holistic
face coding is dissociated from more general “global processing,”
an attentional property revealed, for example, in the classic Navon
task (e.g., faster report of the large letter in a large S made of small
Fs, Navon, 1977): patients with prosopagnosia – the inability to
recognize faces – show impaired holistic face coding but perform
normally on the global Navon task (Duchaine et al., 2007; Busigny
and Rossion, 2011); and, the Himba people of Northern Namibia
show an extremely strong local bias on Navon figures, yet show
normal holistic face coding (Thatcherized faces, Davidoff et al.,
2008).
NO HOLISTIC CODING OF INVERTED FACES
The core observation underlying everything in the present article
is that the illusions that demonstrate holistic perception (Figure 1)
occur for upright faces, but do not occur for inverted faces2. This
was noted in the original articles which introduced these illusions
1Note this definition is stronger and narrower than that used by one group (Gau-
thier, Richler and colleagues), who define the term “holistic processing” based on
the presence of response-incongruency interference, such as would encompass the
Stroop effect (for discussion, see McKone and Robbins, 2007; Rossion, submitted).
The Gauthier and Richler group use composite stimuli, and sometimes refer to their
task as measuring “the composite effect.” However, their task is also referred to as
“the congruency effect,” a name that captures the differences, both theoretical and
in task design, between their task and the traditional composite effect that we con-
sider in the present article. The present article is thus aimed at readers who wish
to use the standard composite effect task in their research, and are interested in
methodological issues associated with that particular task.
2Regarding the theoretical reason why this is the case, a plausible reason is an innate
representation of upright faces (but not inverted faces) – this representation would
support newborns’ ability to discriminate individual faces upright and not inverted
(Turati et al., 2006), and the fact that they perceive the Thatcher illusion upright
and not inverted (Leo and Simion, 2009). However, whatever the reason why holistic
(Thompson, 1980; Young et al., 1987; Tanaka and Farah, 1993) and
in more recent major reviews (e.g., Maurer et al., 2002; Rossion,
submitted). The reader can also appreciate the lack of illusions
inverted by examining Figure 1.
Also crucial to the arguments we develop later is we are not
aware of any circumstances where viewers perceive these illu-
sions for inverted faces. Regarding different types of observers,
anecdotally, when the Thatcher illusion is presented at con-
ferences, it is not the case that, say, the Asian scientists in
the room laugh at the inverted version, nor the female scien-
tists. Instead, there is universal laughter from all groups when
the image is turned to upright. Also arguing for wide applic-
ability across observers is that the Thatcher illusion appears
in popular science writings (e.g., Mlodinow, 2012) and pop-
ular politics (e.g., a Thatcherized moving Mitt Romney; see
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= f1fm6wI09ZM), and in these
cases the presence of the illusion upright is always contrasted with
its absence inverted. (This is not to say observers can never tell
an inverted face has been Thatcherized: particularly after people
become familiar with the illusion upright, they can often “spot”
that the inverted version has also been altered. The point is that
the illusion of bizarreness seems to be completely lacking in the
inverted version.)
It also seems not to matter where one looks in the inverted face:
people do not, for example, suddenly report seeing the Thatcher
illusion inverted if they fixate the mouth region rather than the
eye region. And finally, presentation time does not seem to mat-
ter. A recent paper suggested holistic processing for inverted faces
emerges “eventually” (at 800 ms, Richler et al., 2011b). However,
this used the response-incongruency definition not the perceptual
definition of holistic processing (see text footnote 1). Confirm-
ing the lack of perceptual holistic coding for inverted faces, many
formal studies of the Thatcher, composite and part-whole illu-
sions have used presentation times in the 800-ms-plus range (e.g.,
around 1200 ms in Young et al., 1987) and not reported the illusion
inverted; and informally, readers can examine Figure 1 for as long
as they like and observe that the illusions do not emerge with even
much longer viewing times.
There is also substantial evidence from empirical tasks that
inverted faces are not perceived holistically. Briefly, this includes
most studies that use the classic composite and part-whole tasks
(defined in the next section), the results of which are reviewed
in Figures 2 and 3. Other tasks designed to tap holistic coding
also typically find their effect of interest upright but not inverted,
including: spacing-changed version of part-whole effect (Tanaka
and Sengco, 1997); memory conjunction effects (adults, McKone
and Peh, 2006; infants, Cohen and Cashon, 2001); gaze-contingent
window method (Van Belle et al., 2010); categorical perception in
noise (McKone et al., 2001); identification in the visual periphery
(McKone, 2004); interactive processing in hemiface union (Yovel
et al., 2005); and interactive processing in regression on matching
speeds and multidimensional scaling of similarity ratings (Sergent,
1984).
coding does not occur for inverted faces, the key point for the present article is that
it does not occur.
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 33 | 2
McKone et al. Holistic face coding inverted control
FIGURE 1 | Classic illusions demonstrating holistic face coding and its
specificity to the upright orientation. (A) Thatcher illusion. Flipping the
eyes and mouth in the face makes the face appear bizarre in the upright
orientation, but does not produce bizarreness in the inverted orientation,
and indeed is usually not noticed at all when the inverted version is seen
first. (B) Composite illusion. In the upright orientation, aligning the top-half
of one individual with the bottom-half of another creates the illusion of a
new person. This makes each half look less like the target individual than
when the whole face structure is broken by misaligning the two halves
(making the illusion disappear); for example, the top-half of Barack Obama
looks less like Barack Obama than does the identical top-half image in the
misaligned version. Note the illusion alters perception of both halves: that is,
both Barack Obama (top-half) and Will Smith (bottom-half) seem to change
in appearance in the aligned composite and become difficult to identify
compared to the misaligned (no illusion) condition. In the inverted
orientation, the composite illusion disappears, and the identity of a given
half becomes equally easy to perceive in the aligned and misaligned
versions. (C) Part-whole illusion. The only difference between the two
images in a given orientation is the mouth. In the upright version, altering
the mouth creates illusions of alteration in regions of the rest of the face
(e.g., makes the nose appear shorter on left and longer on right, makes the
eyes appear more interested on left and less interested on right). In the
inverted version, the difference in the mouth shape can be easily seen but
the illusory changes in the rest of the face are not apparent.
Overall, there is strong reason to believe the assumption under-
lying the present article – that holistic coding does not occur for
inverted faces – is valid. Thus, although we will present results
in which inverted faces occasionally produce significant effects on
tasks designed to assess holistic processing, we will argue that this
is the fault of the tasks, and not because holistic coding actually
occurs for inverted faces.
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS AND HISTORICAL USE OF THE
INVERTED CONTROL
There have been many tasks developed with the aim of tapping
holistic face perception. The two we employ here – the composite
effect and the part-whole effect – are the most common, and
designed to tap the corresponding composite illusion and part-
whole illusion in Figures 1B,C. Their methods are illustrated in
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FIGURE 2 | Review of previous findings in composite task (for identity)
for inverted faces. Results are plotted as size of the inverted composite
effect (RT in aligned condition minus RT in misaligned condition, or reverse
subtraction for % correct, using same trials only in same-different versions) as
a percentage of the upright composite effect in the same experiment. If the
inverted composite effect is as large as the upright composite effect, the
score would be +100. If the inverted composite effect is completely absent,
the score will be zero (± Statistical measurement error). All results are for
Caucasian faces with participants either stated to be Caucasian (Robbins and
McKone, 2003, 2007; McKone, 2008; Mondloch and Maurer, 2008) or from
populations likely to be majority Caucasian (Young et al., 1987; Carey and
Diamond, 1994, data are from the adults). All studies used top-half targets. All
studies blocked orientation, except where specified as mixed. All results in
the plot are independent: even where different bars come from the same
article, each comes from different participants and, in all cases except two
(Carey and Diamond, 1994; Mondloch and Maurer, 2008), different face
stimuli. SD, acc, same-different, accuracy. Results show: no inverted
composite effects were significantly greater than zero where this was tested;
and, the average is not average above zero across studies. This lack of
inverted holistic coding applies to both the naming and same-different
versions of the procedure (which use familiar and unfamiliar faces
respectively), and to both accuracy and reaction time (RT) measures.
FIGURE 3 | Review of previous findings in the part-whole task for
inverted faces. Results are plotted as size of the inverted part-whole effect
(% correct in whole condition minus % correct in part condition) as a
percentage of the upright part-whole effect in the same condition of the
same experiment. All results are for Caucasian faces with participants either
stated to be Caucasian (Palermo and Rhodes, 2002; Pellicano et al., 2006) or
from populations likely to be majority Caucasian (Tanaka and Farah, 1993;
Tanaka and Sengco, 1997; Pellicano and Rhodes, 2003; Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2003; Boutet and Faubert, 2006). Scores are averaged over all three test
parts (eyes, nose, mouth). For Palermo and Rhodes (2002), results are for
full-attention conditions only. Findings indicate that inverted part-whole
effects are typically small, and average approximately zero across studies.
This conclusion applies to both the long-term memory version of the
procedure (learn all faces first, then delay, then test all faces) and the
immediate-memory version (learn face 1, immediately test face 1, learn
face 2, etc.).
Figure 4. In the composite effect (naming version), the measure
of holistic processing is the slowing in reaction time to name
the top-half face in the aligned condition as compared to a con-
trol misaligned condition, in which all the same information is
present, and the response requirements are identical, but the facial
configuration is broken by presenting the two halves spatially off-
set (Young et al., 1987; also Carey and Diamond, 1994; Robbins
and McKone, 2003; McKone, 2008). In the composite effect (same-
different version), two physically identical top halves are joined
with different-identity bottom halves, and the measure of holistic
processing is the reduction in accuracy (or increase in reaction
time) to recognize that the top halves are the same in the aligned
condition, as compared to the misaligned baseline (Le Grand
et al., 2004). In the part-whole effect (Tanaka and Farah, 1993),
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FIGURE 4 | Standard experimental tasks designed to produce measures
of the strength of the composite and part-whole illusions. (A) Composite
task (naming). Famous or trained faces are used, and the composite effect is
the extra difficulty (decrease in accuracy or increase in reaction time, RT) to
name the target half of the face (here, the top-half) in the aligned condition
compared to the misaligned condition; non-target halves (here, the bottom)
are always different in identity from the target half. (B) Composite task
(same-different). Novel (non-nameable) faces are used. Two composites
(either two aligned, or two misaligned) are shown successively. The
composite effect is the extra difficulty (decrease in accuracy or increase in RT)
to recognize that the target halves of the face (here, the top halves) are the
same when combined with different non-target halves, in the aligned
condition compared to the misaligned condition. Note that extra different
trials are also tested (target halves differ across the two successive
composites), but these are merely to keep the participants’ responses
honest, and are not used in the calculation of the composite effect because
holistic coding does not make a clear prediction as to the direction of
difference between aligned and misaligned trials (Robbins and McKone,
2007). (C) Part-whole task. Participants learn whole faces, then are tested on
their memory for a part (mouth in the example shown here; other trials use
eyes or nose) either in the face context (Whole condition), or cut out from the
face and shown in isolation (Part condition). In all tasks, the inverted version
of the task is identical to the upright version except that all faces, in all
conditions, are rotated 180˚.
the measure is the amount by which recognition of a previously
learned face part (e.g., Bill’s nose) is better in the context of the
whole learned face (Bill’s nose in Bill’s face versus John’s nose in
Bill’s face) than when presented alone (Bill’s nose versus John’s
nose).
Previous studies demonstrate that, very often, these tasks pro-
vide a pure measure of holistic processing. That is, consistent
with the orientation-specificity of the perceptual illusions they
are designed to tap, strong composite and part-whole effects are
observed upright but, crucially, are not found inverted in the same
experiment (see review in Figures 2 and 3). This inverted con-
trol is important because the procedure, task structure, response
requirements, and stimuli are matched exactly to upright in all
ways except the face orientation; thus, general cognitive factors
(e.g., memory ability, attentional ability, decisional ability) should
affect each orientation equally.
This means that a lack of effect for inverted faces in a given
setting rules out any general cognitive factors as origins of the
upright effect in that setting. For example, two secondary fac-
tors have been suggested by previous authors, namely top-down
response biases contributing to the same-different version of the
composite effect (Richler et al., 2011a), and encoding-specificity
effects on memory contributing to the part-whole effect (Gauthier
and Tarr, 2002; Leder and Carbon, 2005). However, because these
general cognitive factors would be expected to make similar con-
tributions regardless of orientation, a lack of effect for inverted
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faces indicates that, in the setting tested, these variables have not
contributed to the effect observed for upright faces.
In contrast, if a composite or part-whole effect is found for
inverted faces in a given setting, then this argues that secondary
cognitive factors have contributed to the task. Presuming that these
factors equally affect the upright version of the task, then this in
turn implies that the upright composite or part-whole score has
been contaminated by this same contribution, and is not pure a
measure of holistic coding.
In early studies using the composite and part-whole tasks, most
researchers regularly included the inverted control. Recent stud-
ies, however, have tended to drop the inverted condition, and test
only upright. This is all very well as long as we can be certain
that, under all circumstances, the specific experimental design and
participant population will produce no composite or part-whole
effect inverted, and thus researchers can take the upright scores as
pure measures of holistic coding. In the present article we show
that this is not always the case.
PART 1: THE COMPOSITE EFFECT
We first consider the composite effect. As with any experimen-
tal measure designed to tap holistic coding, we would hope that
this task should always reveal no composite effect for inverted
faces – that is, no increased difficulty in the aligned compared to
misaligned conditions. However, this idea relies on an unstated
assumption that holistic coding is the only factor that could
potentially make the aligned condition more difficult than the
misaligned condition. We argue here that there is at least one
secondary cognitive factor – the size of the spotlight of visual atten-
tion – that could sometimes influence task performance in both
orientations, thus producing “false” effects (i.e., effects not driven
by holistic perception) that are observable inverted and contribute
to a less-than-pure measure of holistic perception upright.
THE COMPOSITE EFFECT MEASURE CONTAINS AN UNSTATED
ASSUMPTION ABOUT VISUOSPATIAL ATTENTION
The possibility that the composite task could sometimes produce
a false effect inverted is suggested by considerations of the distri-
bution of visuospatial attention. In the composite paradigm, the
task is to attend to one half of the face (e.g., the top), and either
name it (naming version) or determine whether it is same or differ-
ent in identity to that in a second composite stimulus (matching
version), while ignoring the non-target (e.g., bottom) half. This
task is based on an implicit assumption, namely that visuospatial
attention can be completely and rapidly localized to the target half.
One way to conceptualize this is to think of spatial attention as
a “spotlight” that can be moved around the visual field, and which
can zoom in and out to include different amounts of information
(La Berge, 1983; Eriksen and St James, 1986). In the composite
task, participants are required to effortfully narrow this spotlight to
attend to just one half of a composite face, while excluding conflict-
ing information from the non-target half. The idea underlying the
composite measure (Figure 5A) is then that (a) in the misaligned
condition, this voluntary restriction of spatial attention to the tar-
get half is easy, (b) in the aligned condition, involuntary holistic
perception of the entire face means that, despite voluntary restric-
tion of spatial attention to the target half, the different-identity
information from the non-target half is still processed resulting in
increased difficulty in the aligned condition as compared to the
misaligned control (that is, a composite effect). For inverted faces,
holistic coding is not engaged, and so we should expect spatial
attention to be easily localized to the target half in both aligned
and misaligned conditions, resulting in no difference in difficulty
between the two conditions (i.e., no composite effect). However, if
for some reason the participant has a broad attentional spotlight
and is inefficient at narrowing this spotlight to the target half, then
a “false” composite effect could be observed – present even for
inverted faces – because (as illustrated in Figure 5B) more inter-
fering information from the non-target half would fall within the
attentional spotlight in the aligned condition than the misaligned
condition.
FACTORS THAT MIGHT PLAUSIBLY AFFECT DISTRIBUTION OF
VISUOSPATIAL ATTENTION AND PRODUCE FALSE COMPOSITE EFFECTS
We now consider several factors that could affect the ease or effi-
ciency with which participants can focus their spatial attention
purely on the target half of the face. These factors potentially affect
the likelihood that the composite task will produce a false com-
posite effect for inverted faces and, correspondingly, an impure
measure of holistic coding for upright faces.
Global processing bias in East Asian cultures
Several paradigms have produced evidence of a race/culture dif-
ference in the way East Asians and Western Caucasians pre-
fer to allocate visuospatial attention, with the typical pattern
being that Asian participants have stronger global processing
than Caucasians, and weaker local processing. In Navon figures
(e.g., large S made of small Fs, Navon, 1977) Asians respond
faster than Caucasians when the target is the global letter, and
slower than Caucasians when the target is the local letter (McK-
one et al., 2010). Asian participants also demonstrate a stronger
center-surround size illusion suggesting difficulty with attend-
ing locally and ignoring context (Doherty et al., 2008). It has
also been reported that Asians are better at estimating length
of a line relative to a surrounding frame (global processing)
while Westerners are better at estimating its absolute length
(local processing; Kitayama et al., 2003), and that Asian observers
attend more to contextual information than Westerners when
viewing scenes, describing scenes, and categorizing groups of
objects (Masuda and Nisbett, 2001; Norenzayan et al., 2002;
Miyamoto et al., 2006; although, see Zhou et al., 2008; Evans
et al., 2009). Finally, Asians fixate centrally on an object, rather
than moving their eyes around as do Caucasians (e.g., Blais et al.,
2008).
In the composite task, a global processing preference in Asians
could lead to difficulty or lack of efficiency in restricting spatial
attention to the target half. As illustrated in Figure 5B, this could
then lead to Asians showing false composite effects for inverted
faces. Importantly, the previous findings reviewed in Figure 2,
showing lack of composite effects for inverted faces, come from
subjects either stated to be Caucasian or tested in Western coun-
tries and likely to be primarily Caucasian. The composite effect
has been tested in Asian participants (e.g., Michel et al., 2006b;
Zhu et al., 2010), but only for upright faces. To examine the extent
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FIGURE 5 | Visuospatial attention as potential contributor to a false
composite effect (i.e., one present even without holistic coding). (A) The
unstated assumption underlying the composite measure is that spatial
attention (blue oval) can always be narrowed solely to the target half in both
orientations (and the composite effect occurs only because holistic coding of
all facial regions occurs in aligned upright). But (B) if visuospatial attention is
broader, this will produce a false composite effect – in both
orientations – because more interfering information from the non-target half
falls in the spotlight of attention in the aligned condition than in the misaligned
condition.
to which the upright composite effect provides a pure measure of
holistic processing in Asian observers, it is necessary to test whether
Asian participants show composite effects for inverted faces. One
possibility is that we might observe that Asian participants consis-
tently show significant composite effects for inverted faces; if so,
this would argue that upright composite effects in Asian partici-
pants are not a pure measure of holistic coding, and thus cast some
doubt on the theoretical interpretation of upright-face composite
effects in previous studies.
Sex differences
Sex differences can sometimes occur in preference for global ver-
sus local processing (although this does not always happen, e.g.,
see McKone et al., 2010), with females more global than males. In
the classic framed-line test of “field dependence,” women are less
able to ignore the context of the tilted frame to veridically perceive
the contained line as vertical (Ji et al., 2000). Women are also more
sensitive to the center-surround size illusion than men (Phillips
et al., 2004), and moreover this can be additive with race (and
indeed profession, with Asian females in psychology most global,
and Caucasian males in computing science and mathematics most
local, Doherty et al., 2008).
Traditionally, researchers do not report their composite effect
results separately for male and female participants. Where the
mean composite effect for inverted faces is at (or non-significantly
below) zero, this is unlikely to be problematic; that is, the data
could not be hiding a composite effect in one sex. However, where
a numerically non-trivial inverted composite effect is found in
the full set of participants, then it is possible that, even if this
is non-significant in the full sample, there could be a sex differ-
ence with a false composite effect present in one sex (most likely
females).
Top- versus bottom-half target: location of the eyes attracts attention
In most studies using the composite effect, the target has been
the top-half, which contains the eyes. It is this situation that has
produced the lack of composite effect for inverted faces reviewed
in Figure 2. Bottom-half targets are known to produce a com-
posite effect for upright faces (e.g., Young et al., 1987). However,
to our knowledge, only two previous studies of facial identity
composites have examined the inverted composite effect using
a bottom-half target (i.e., mouth-and-chin half). In Robbins and
McKone (2003) results could not be evaluated because accuracy
for inverted bottom-target faces was too low to determine if this
condition produced composite effects or not. In a new analysis
of data from Robbins and McKone (2007), splitting the reported
scores by target half, bottom-half targets produced a surprisingly
large composite effect for inverted faces (66.7% of upright value,
at least in young adults; there was no inverted composite effect in
middle-aged adults).
The question of what happens for inverted bottom-half targets
is important because eyes attract attention, and thus may broaden
the attentional spotlight when the task is to focus on the other
half of the face (i.e., mouth half). Typically, the eyes are the most
attended feature in any given face task, and this attention to the
eyes appears a largely involuntary process (e.g., Henderson et al.,
2005; Itier et al., 2007a,b; Laidlaw et al., 2012) and is specifically
related to location of eyes rather than, say, an upper field bias (Levy
et al., 2012). When the top-half of the face is the target, eye attrac-
tion is not problematic, and indeed the presence of the eyes in the
target half may even help facilitate narrowing of spatial attention
to the target half. However, when the bottom-half of the face is the
target, the eyes are in the non-target half, and it is possible that this
could impair the ability to direct or narrow attention to the target
half, producing a false composite effect for inverted faces.
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Quality of join
Across studies, face composite stimuli have varied in the type of
join between the two halves in the aligned condition. Standard
procedure in all studies is to ensure that the outer edges of the face
line up across the two halves, but the nature of the join in the inter-
nal regions of the two halves varies noticeably. This is illustrated in
Figure 6. In a few studies, the join appears seamless: the two nose
sections are lined up perfectly and the join between the two halves
is practically invisible (Robbins and McKone, 2003; Le Grand et al.,
2004; Susilo et al., 2009). More typically, the join forms an obvi-
ous line between the two halves (Young et al., 1987; Carey and
Diamond, 1994; McKone, 2008; Robbins and Coltheart, 2012).
Finally, the many studies from Bruno Rossion’s lab have used a
small gap between the two halves (e.g., Michel et al., 2006b; Ros-
sion and Boremanse, 2008) and other groups have also adopted
this approach (e.g., Kuefner et al., 2010b).
Potentially, some of these different types of joins might pro-
duce false composite effects for inverted faces. It is possible that
spatial attention might be easier to narrow purely to the target half
where the cues to continuation across the two halves are weak-
est. If so, then we would predict the “best” results (i.e., smallest
composite effect inverted, and thus purest measure upright) in
the Rossion-style gap stimuli due to the break in the external
and internal contours, and the worst results (largest composite
effect inverted, least pure measure upright) from the “invisible
join” stimuli because these have the strongest continuation cues
across the two halves.
However, it is also possible that the Rossion-style gap stimuli
could produce the worst results, due to a mechanism that could
result in confusion in the early visual system regarding the num-
ber of objects present. The gap between halves could potentially
be interpreted by the visual system in two different ways: (a) as a
gray “occluder” that is in front of a complete face (single joined
object), or (b) as part of the background, showing between two
isolated, distinct face halves (two objects; Nakayama et al., 1989).
When a stimulus is ambiguous in this manner, the visual system
may have to switch back and forth between these interpretations
(Blake et al., 2003). This switching would slow processing in the
aligned condition, where the ambiguity is present, compared to the
misaligned condition where no ambiguity arises (all cues indicate
two objects), resulting in a false composite effect for inverted faces
and a less-than-pure measure of holistic coding upright. Indeed,
two published tests of inverted faces using Rossion’s gap stimuli
with top-half targets have reported significant composite effects
for inverted faces (Goffaux and Rossion, 2006; Rossion and Bore-
manse, 2008; in the latter study, the inverted composite effect was
23% of the upright value on RT, and 76% on accuracy).
Potential interactions between factors
If any of the above factors do lead to false composite effects, it
might be that the factors operate in a simple, independent man-
ner. For example, it could be that Asians always show an inverted
composite effect while Caucasians never do, or that “invisible join”
stimuli always show an inverted composite effect while Rossion’s
gap stimuli never do, and so on.
However, it is also possible that there could be complex interac-
tions between factors. For example, perhaps global bias differences
based on race might interact with sensitivity to the particular
contour continuation cues in the stimuli. Or, it might be that
eyes attracting attention produces a false inverted composite effect
for bottom-half targets in Caucasians, but that additional cultural
norms for avoiding direct eye contact in Asians (Argyle and Cook,
1976) could mean the same effect does not occur in Asians. Or,
because eyes attract attention more in women than in men (at
least when judging facial expression, Hall et al., 2010), perhaps
an inverted composite effect for bottom-half targets (where eyes
are in the to-be-ignored top-half) could be present in women and
not men.
COMPOSITE TASK FOR FACIAL EXPRESSIONS
So far, we have discussed the composite effect only regarding
its use in assessing holistic coding of facial identity. However,
the composite effect can also be used to tap holistic coding of
facial expression. As with identity, there is an underlying per-
ceptual illusion: combining the top-half of one expression (e.g.,
anger) with the bottom-half of another (e.g., disgust) produces
FIGURE 6 | Join quality in composite stimuli. Examples show aligned composite faces of the forms used in different studies.
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FIGURE 7 |The composite illusion for facial expression composites.
(A) Upright faces. In the two top-half target aligned composites (left box), the
two identical top halves appear somewhat different in expression (left more
negative in valence when combined with bottom-half of a negative expression
disgust ; right more positive when combined with positive expression happy );
also, it only becomes easier to see that the top-half expression is in fact sad
when composite halves are misaligned (middle stimulus). In the two
bottom-half target aligned composites (right box), the two identical bottom
halves appear somewhat different in expression (left mouth and lower-nose
more angry when combined with top-half of anger ; right looks more like
worry, or perhaps a speaking or singing action, when combined with sad );
also, it only becomes easier to see that the bottom-half expression is in fact
surprise when composite halves are misaligned (middle stimulus). (B)
Inverted faces. As with the other holistic coding illusions, the expression
composite illusion disappears when inverted. That is, it becomes easy to see
that the two top-half (eyes) target halves match (left box), that the two
bottom-half (mouth) target halves match (right box), and that both match the
expression shown by the corresponding half in the misaligned composite.
an alteration in the apparent emotion of a target half. Also, cru-
cially, as with identity this illusion disappears for inverted faces
(see Figure 7).
In the corresponding experimental tasks, a composite effect is
revealed when participants are impaired at naming the emotion
of the target half-face (labeling version), or recognizing that two
composites contain the same emotion in the target half (matching
version), in the aligned condition compared to misaligned base-
line. This composite effect is obtained when the face is upright
(Calder et al., 2000; White, 2000; Calder and Jansen, 2005; Durand
et al., 2007; Palermo et al., 2011).
For inverted, a review of previous studies suggests that fur-
ther investigation is important. First, the expression composite
technique relies on the same implicit assumption about ability to
narrow spatial attention as does the identity composite effect, and
all the same factors which could produce potentially false compos-
ite effects for inverted identity composites could also potentially
produce false effects for expression composites. Second, unlike
identity where top-half targets have been the norm, expression
composite articles typically use data from both top-half targets
(for the expressions anger, fear, sadness, which are well identified
from the top-half of the face), and bottom-half targets (for the
expressions happiness, disgust, surprise, which are well identified
from the bottom-half of the face; Calder et al., 2000). Third, only
three studies have reported the composite effect for inverted faces3,
and each of these reported the inverted composite effect for only
a single target half. Authors explicitly made the assumption that
both halves would be equivalent. In fact, the results that are avail-
able (Figure 8) are suggestive of quite a sizeable inverted composite
effect for bottom-half targets (approximately 40–60% the size of
upright in Calder et al., 2000; White, 2000), with the composite
effect unambiguously absent only for top halves (Durand et al.,
2007).
EXPERIMENTS 1–5: A COLLECTION OF COMPOSITE EFFECT RESULTS
FOR INVERTED FACES
We now present a series of composite effect results for inverted
faces. These results do not come from a targeted series of experi-
ments, investigating each of the potential factors in turn. Rather,
they come from a selection of studies (either previously unpub-
lished, or with data in certain participant groups unpublished)
that we had available. Each of the studies confounds more than
one of the factors we have argued could, potentially, affect spatial
attention and thus validity of the composite measure. However,
3Calder and Jansen (2005) also used inverted composite stimuli, but the size of the
composite effect could not be calculated from their data because they tested only
aligned inverted composites without the misaligned condition.
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FIGURE 8 | Review of previous findings of inverted expression
composite effects. Inverted composite scores for the inverted orientation
(i.e., difference between aligned and misaligned) are expressed as
percentage of the upright composite scores in the same condition in the
same study. For the top-half as the target, the only study available reported
no composite effect inverted (Durand et al., 2007, for accuracy measure, RT
was not reported): results are plotted for 11 year olds as well as adults
because there was some suggestion of a ceiling effect for adults (which
would not allow fair evaluation of inverted composite effect size). For the
bottom-half as the target (Calder et al., 2000; White, 2000; both studies
measured RT, with accuracy at ceiling), the inverted composite effect was
not significant alone in either study. However, there are not strong grounds
for concluding there was no inverted composite effect: in both cases, it
was positive, approached significance (p=0.07 in Calder et al.; exact
p-value not calculable in White), and was at 40–60% of the upright value.
taken together, the results across studies offer some insight into
four key questions:
(1) Is it possible to obtain significant false composite effects for
inverted faces?
(2) If so, do false composite effects for inverted faces arise under
a simple to understand circumstance, determined by a single
variable (e.g., always in Asian participants, never in Caucasian
participants)?
(3) Alternatively, do false composite effects for inverted faces
arise in a manner that suggests a role for multiple factors
in interaction?
(4) Can we advise that researchers continue to drop the inverted
control condition, or is it instead necessary to test inverted
faces in all studies, in order to ensure valid interpretation of
the upright results?
Our studies had originally been designed around a variety of
theoretical questions (e.g., the role of holistic processing in the
other-race effect; the contribution of holistic processing to expres-
sion recognition at different viewing distances). We do not here
discuss the upright composite effect results relevant to addressing
those theoretical questions. Our focus is on the inverted results.
All the conditions for which we present inverted data produced
significant composite effects for upright faces. In most cases the
inverted composite effect was noticeably and significantly smaller
than the upright composite effect, and we draw attention in the
Results to findings where this was not the case.
BRIEF METHODS
We present results from five different experiments: four testing the
identity composite effect, one testing the expression composite
effect.
Participants
All participants were tested at the Australian National University.
Where race/culture of participants was varied, we use the following
shorthand terms:
• Caucasian refers to individuals with all known ancestry Euro-
pean (typically, 75% of reported ancestry in our population is
from the British Isles), who were living in Australia (a Western
culture).
• Asian refers to individuals who were both racially and cultur-
ally East Asian. That is, the participant and all known ancestors
were East Asian or South East Asian (i.e., from China, Singapore,
Malaysia, etc.; typically 85% of ancestry was Chinese-ethnicity
even if the participant was born in another Asian country such
as Singapore), and the participant was born and raised in Asia
and came to Australia to study as an overseas student.
• Asian-Australian (tested in one experiment) refers to second-
generation Australians of immigrant parents. These participants
were physically fully Asian, with all known ancestry of both par-
ents East Asian or South East Asian; but who had been born and
raised in Australia. These individuals had generally had strong
exposure to both Western and Eastern cultures, and varied in
affiliation to each.
Experiments
The Section “Detailed Methods” at the end of the article gives full
details for each experiment. Here, we give a brief overview of the
key points. All tasks used standard general methods.
Experiment 1: identity composite naming, with typical join.
This used the naming version of the composite task with famil-
iarized faces (derived from Carey and Diamond, 1994). The target
half was always the top-half (containing the eyes). Participants
learned to name six top-half faces and then for the composite
test saw each aligned with 10 different-identity bottom halves,
intermixed with the same stimuli shown in misaligned version.
Stimuli were presented until response, the task was designed so
accuracy was at ceiling, and the composite effect was measured as
the difference in reaction time to name the top-half (aligned minus
misaligned). Stimuli used“typical”joins (i.e.,of intermediate qual-
ity, see example in Figure 6). All face stimuli were Caucasian.
Participants were Asian, Caucasian, and Asian-Australian.
Experiment 2: identity composite same-different, with invisi-
ble join. This used the same-different method of the composite
experiment with novel faces. Both top-half targets (containing the
eyes) and bottom-half targets were tested. On each trial, partici-
pants saw two composites sequentially, and indicated whether the
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target half of the face was the same (physically identical; 50%
of trials) or different (from a different person) in the second
composite compared to the first, ignoring the other half. Non-
target halves were always different-identity. Stimulus presentation
was brief (300 ms per composite) and the measure was accuracy.
(Note a valid RT measure was not available due to response ques-
tion intervening between second composite and response.) The
composite effect was calculated in the standard way: accuracy
for same-misaligned trials minus accuracy for same-aligned trials
(e.g., Le Grand et al., 2004; Michel et al., 2006b; note that holis-
tic coding does not make a clear prediction for different-aligned
trials, Robbins and McKone, 2007). Face stimuli tested were both
Asian and Caucasian. Participants were Asian and Caucasian.
Experiment 3: identity composite same-different, using Exper-
iment 2 stimuli with added gap. This experiment was exactly
as for Experiment 2, except that only top-half target conditions
were tested, and the face stimuli had a small gap added between
halves to match the format used by the Rossion-lab (e.g., Michel
et al., 2006b). The hat was also removed, and the hair cut out,
again to match the Rossion-lab format. Participants were Asian
and Caucasian.
Experiment 4: identity composite same-different, with Rossion-
lab gap stimuli. This experiment used the exact stimuli and
procedure of Michel et al. (2006b): we thank Caroline Michel and
Bruno Rossion for sending us the stimuli and experimental script.
The only difference was that Michel et al. tested upright faces only.
We tested upright faces first, and then repeated the experiment
in a second block with the same stimuli inverted. All targets were
top-half, as in the original. Note the Michel et al. procedure differs
in several respects from that of Experiments 2 and 3: most notably,
the first face in each pair of composites is always presented aligned
and it is only in the second face that aligned versus misaligned sta-
tus is varied. Stimulus presentation duration was 600 ms for the
first face, and until response with a maximum of 1 s for the second.
Both accuracy and RT (from onset of second composite stimulus)
was measured. Face stimuli were both Asian and Caucasian. Our
participants were Asian and Caucasian.
Experiment 5: expression composite same-different, with invisi-
ble join. This task used the same-different version of the expres-
sion composite effect. Both top-half targets (containing the eyes)
and bottom-half targets were tested. On each trial, participants
saw two composites sequentially, and indicated whether the target
half of the face was the same expression (50% of trials) or dif-
ferent expression in the second composite compared to the first,
ignoring the other half. Non-target halves were always different
expression. The first composite stimulus appeared for 250 ms and
the second remained on the screen until response. The design
produced high accuracy, with RT for correct decisions on same
trials as the measure of interest. To allow fair comparison of com-
posite effect size across top- and bottom-half conditions (which
differ substantially in mean RT; bottom halves are faster due to
the inclusion of “happy”), we calculated the composite effect as
percentage change from baseline reaction time [i.e., composite
effect= (aligned–misaligned)/misaligned ∗100;
Ramon et al., 2010]. Face stimuli and participants were Caucasian.
Participants were tested on four stimulus sizes; scores from these
conditions are averaged.
RESULTS
Results are organized to address, in turn, the issues of (a) partic-
ipant race/culture together with stimulus join quality; (b) partic-
ipant sex together with stimulus join quality; and (c) composite
findings for top- versus bottom-half targets.
Identity composite for top halves: participant race/culture, plus
stimulus join quality
Four experiments varied participant race/culture. Because these
experiments also differed in stimulus join quality, we necessarily
discuss the results of these two variables together. Most of our
identity composite experiments tested top halves only, and so this
section reports only top-half data. Figure 9 presents the size of
the composite effect for inverted faces, separately for Asians, Cau-
casians, and in one experiment Asian-Australians, using top-half
target conditions from Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4. Several results
emerge.
First, the typical pattern of no composite effect for inverted
faces was found in the majority of cases. This included: Caucasian
observers in Experiment 1 (Caucasian faces); Asian observers for
Asian faces in Experiment 3; and Asian and Caucasian observers,
for both races of faces, in Experiments 2 and 4. Across experiments,
the lack of inverted composite effect occurred on both accuracy
and reaction time, and for both own-race and other-race faces.
Second, it is clearly possible to obtain false composite effects
for inverted faces, with four cases of significant effects in Figure 9:
Asian observers in Experiment 1 (Caucasian faces); and, in Exper-
iment 3, Asian observers on Caucasian faces, and Caucasian
observers on both races of face. Thus, it is possible to find false
composite effects for inverted faces; this in turn argues that –
because the secondary cognitive factor/s that must drive this false
effect will also operate for upright faces – the composite scores
for upright in these same settings do not provide completely pure
measures of holistic face coding. Comparing inverted to upright,
in Experiment 3 all the inverted composite effects were much
smaller than those in the equivalent condition for upright (aver-
aging one-third the size; and significantly smaller than upright in
all cases, with p < 0.001, p= 0.023, p= 0.001, p= 0.001 for the
four conditions left to right of Experiment 3 in Figure 9). How-
ever, in Experiment 1, the Asian observers’ composite effect only
trended toward being smaller inverted (M = 49 ms) than upright
(M = 72 ms), with this difference not significant despite the sub-
stantial sample size of n= 64, t (63)= 1.526, p= 0.132. Thus, at
least occasionally, it is possible to find inverted composite effects
that are so large that they essentially invalidate the composite
scores for upright as providing any measure of holistic coding
at all.
Third, no simple single variable explained when false compos-
ite effects for inverted faces did or did not emerge. Regarding race,
there was no evidence that Asians (who might have a broader spot-
light of attention) consistently showed inverted composite effects
while Caucasians did not: instead, each race of observer sometimes
showed an inverted composite effect, and each race of observer
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FIGURE 9 | Composite effect scores for inverted faces in Experiments 1–4
(varying in stimulus join quality), as a function of race of participant.
Note the two different y -axis scales: the ms scale is for conditions reporting
the composite effect on reaction times (for which composite effect= aligned
minus misaligned); the % scale is for conditions reporting the composite
effect on accuracy (for which composite effect=misaligned minus aligned). To
test the significance of the inverted composite effect in each condition, mean
(i.e., height of bar) was compared to zero using one-sample two-tailed t-tests.
Stars above bars indicate conditions that produced significant “false”
composite effects greater than zero for inverted faces at *p < 0.05 and
**p < 0.01. Error bars show ±1 SEM. Number of participants indicated by n,
in italics below or above each data bar.
sometimes did not. We also note that, within Asian-Australians,
there was no correlation between culture (individual’s affiliation as
more Eastern or more Western) and size of the inverted composite
effect; see Figure 10. Regarding join quality, there was again no
ordered pattern. Figure 9 shows it was not the case that inverted
composite effects were largest with invisible joins (Experiment
2), intermediate with “typical” partially visible joins (Experiment
1), and smallest with gap stimuli (Experiments 3 and 4); that is,
we did not observe the pattern predicted if the sole driver of the
composite effect magnitude was the extent of cues to continua-
tion across the two halves. Nor was there any support for the idea
that gap stimuli consistently lead to the largest inverted composite
effect, as predicted if the sole driver of composite effect magnitude
was one-versus-two-object ambiguity introduced in the aligned
condition by the gap4.
Overall, the results suggest a complex pattern of interaction
between variables. There were differences across both race and join
quality, but these variables must operate in interaction, rather than
additively, to contribute to explaining the findings across experi-
ments in Figure 9. Further, even in interaction, these two variables
are insufficient to explain the pattern of findings: Experiments
3 and 4 were matched for both race of observers and join qual-
ity (both used gap stimuli), yet Experiment 3 produced inverted
composite effects while Experiment 4 did not. This suggests some
4Also note we checked that the differences across conditions could not be attributed
to uninteresting explanations such as ceiling effects in some conditions leading
to small or absent composite effects: for example, all inverted conditions had
lower accuracy and slower reaction times than the same condition in the upright
orientations, and the upright conditions produced strong composite effects.
additional interaction with specific aspects of task procedure –
perhaps, for example, the specific face stimuli (which differed
across the studies), or the stimulus duration (which also differed),
or whether the first composite of the pair in misaligned trials was
misaligned as in Experiment 3 or aligned as in Experiment 4 – or
non-measured attributes of participants (e.g., myopia level, see
Discussion).
Identity composite for top halves: participant sex, plus stimulus join
quality
Figure 11 re-plots the results of the same Experiments 1–4 (again,
top-half targets only), but now breaking the data down by partici-
pant sex rather than race. Note the sample sizes were not sufficient
to make it worthwhile breaking into males and females separately
within each race.
The results show that sex can sometimes influence whether
inverted composite effects are found, but that sex, as with race
and join quality, does not provide a simple single variable expla-
nation of the findings. Experiments 1 and 3 produced false
inverted composite effects in both sexes, while Experiment 2 pro-
duced them only in males, and Experiment 4 produced them
in neither sex. Again, this implies complex interactions between
variables.
Identity and expression composites for bottom versus top halves:
eye attraction
Two of our experiments included testing bottom-half targets:
Experiment 2 for face identity composites, and Experiment 5 for
face expression composites. Figure 12 plots results separately for
top-half targets, which contain the attention-attracting eyes, and
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FIGURE 10 | Correlations between culture – four measures of degree of
an individual’s affiliation as more Eastern or more Western – and size
of the inverted composite effect. Correlations computed within
Asian-Australians, n=25, data from Experiment 1. Asian (Australian)
identity was measured with Cameron’s (2004) social identity scale:
example items are “I have a lot in common with other Asians (Australians)”
and “I often think about the fact that I am Asian (Australian).” Independent
versus interdependent self-construal was measured with Singelis’ (1994)
scale: example independent item is “I enjoy being unique and different
from others in many respects”; example interdependent item is “If my
brother or sister fails, I feel responsible.” Predicted direction of correlation
is derived from the theory (Kühnen and Oyserman, 2002; Nisbett and
Miyamoto, 2005; Lin and Han, 2009) that greater interdependence in Asian
cultures increases global processing. This predicts: positive correlations
with inverted composite effect for Eastern-affiliation measures (Asian
identity, interdependence); and negative correlations for Western-affiliation
measures (Australian identity, independence). This pattern was not found.
No obtained correlations were significant (all ps > 0.16 for two-tailed
comparison to zero) and two of the four were in the reverse-to-predicted
direction.
for bottom-half targets, in which the attention-attracting eyes are
in the to-be-ignored half. In both experiments, clear evidence of
an effect of target half emerged, and to illustrate this we have plot-
ted the composite effect scores for upright faces as well as the usual
inverted faces.
For identity composites, top-half targets produced the stan-
dard result of a large composite effect for upright faces, and no
composite effect for inverted faces. Bottom-half targets, in con-
trast, produced a significant composite effect inverted that, most
importantly, was as large inverted as upright. Statistical analysis
showed a significant two-way interaction between target half and
orientation, F(1,47)= 24.197, MSE= 1399.32, p < 0.001. For top-
half targets, the upright composite effect was significantly greater
than the inverted composite effect, t (47)= 7.339, p < 0.001, and
the inverted composite effect was very small (Figure 12, only
2.8%, which is less than one fifth the size of the upright effect
at 15.5%). For bottom halves, in contrast, the inverted compos-
ite effect was as large as for upright with no significant difference
in the means, t (47)= 1.194, p= 0.239. In addition, this inverted
composite effect for bottom-half targets (8.9%) was three times
the size, and significantly larger, than the inverted composite effect
for top-half targets (2.8%) t (47)= 3.627, p= 0.001. (Note these
analyses are collapsed over race of observer and race of faces; there
was no suggestion of any interactions involving these variables, all
Fs < 1.)
The same results were obtained for the expression compos-
ite task (Experiment 5). Statistical analysis showed a signifi-
cant two-way interaction between target half and orientation,
F(1,25)= 10.989, MSE= 72.933, p= 0.003. For top-half targets,
the upright composite effect was significantly greater than the
inverted composite effect, t (25)= 2.926, p= 0.007, and there was
no inverted composite effect (mean slightly below zero). For
bottom halves, in contrast, the inverted composite effect was as
large as for upright with no significant difference in the means,
t (25)= 0.123, p= 0.903, and the average composite effect was
greater than zero, t (26)= 2.917, p= 0.007.
These results argue that, with bottom-half targets, identity and
expression composite effect scores for upright faces did not pro-
vide a measure of holistic coding with any validity. Presumably, this
derives from the eyes mandatorily attracting attention, forcing a
broad spotlight of visual attention that includes the non-target
half of the face.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiments 1–5 allow us to answer our four
questions of interest as follows.
(1) Is it possible to obtain significant false composite effects for
inverted faces? Yes. Moreover, the inverted composite effects
can sometimes be as large as composite effects for upright
faces.
(2) Do false composite effects for inverted faces arise under a simple
to understand circumstance, determined by a single variable?
No. The only exception here is that our results suggest using
the bottom-half-face as the target half is consistently prob-
lematic, with very large composite effects obtained inverted5.
Indeed, the generality of this finding is suggested by sim-
ilar findings from three previous studies that also tested
bottom-half targets and reported inverted composite effects
of substantial magnitude compared to those for upright faces
(40–67%: Figure 8 for expression; Robbins and McKone,2007,
for identity in young adults).
(3) Alternatively, do false composite effects for inverted faces arise
in a manner that suggests a role for multiple factors in inter-
action? Yes. Inverted composite effects varied in magnitude
across race, sex, and join quality, but none of these factors
in isolation was sufficient to explain the pattern of results.
5Note we do not think our results imply that, when faces are upright, holistic coding
does not occur with bottom-half targets (although Rossion, submitted, has argued it
may be weaker than when fixating the top-half, and discusses reasons why); instead,
our argument is our results show we cannot use the composite effect to reliably
measure holistic coding.
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FIGURE 11 | Composite effect scores for inverted faces in Experiments
1–4 (varying in stimulus join quality), as a function of sex of participant.
In Experiments 2 and 3, scores are averaged over race of observer (due to
lack of race of observer× sex-of-observer interactions, smallest p=0.212). In
Experiments 1 and 4, these interactions could not be evaluated due to very
small n in one condition, so scores are for Asians-only in Experiment 1, and
Caucasians-only in Experiment 4. Figure formatting as in Figure 9. *p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01.
Indeed, even allowing for interactions between them, no sim-
ple explanation of the pattern leaps out: for example, it is not
the case that inverted composite effects are found in Asians
when joins provide strong continuity cues. Moreover, there is
good reason to assume that further factors not measured here
will additionally influence whether or not inverted composite
effects are obtained. In McKone et al. (2008) we showed that,
within Asian-Australians, level of myopia (short-sightedness)
correlated with magnitude of the inverted composite effect
(higher myopia gave smaller composite effects). Myopia was
not measured in any of the other participants in Experi-
ments 1–5 (although a typical expectation would be that mean
myopia level is higher in Asian than in Caucasian Australian
participants; Morgan and Rose, 2005). We also note that the
present experiments have investigated only typically devel-
oping young adults. Children are known to have difficulty
compared to adults in reducing the size of the spotlight of
visual attention (Lundy et al., 2001); this suggests that use
of the composite task in children may produce more false
inverted composite effects than in adults. Ability to narrow
the attentional spotlight could also potentially be affected
in individuals who have suffered brain injury or atypical
brain development (see Susilo et al., 2011 for discussion): this
includes prosopagnosia, a face disorder in which researchers
have strong theoretical reason to want to test holistic
processing.
(4) Can we advise that researchers continue to drop the inverted
control condition, or is it instead necessary to test inverted faces
in all studies, in order to ensure valid interpretation of the
upright results? Unfortunately, our results lead to the unwel-
come conclusion that researchers cannot drop the inverted
control condition, as has been common in recent composite
studies, but instead need to include the inverted control in
every separate study that is run. It seems unlikely that even
extensive research would uncover a simple factor or set of fac-
tors that could be used to determine in advance whether a
given combination of task procedure and participant group
will, or will not, display a significant composite effect inverted.
Indeed, we would suggest that attempting such research would
be a waste of resources. Instead, the most realistic approach
may be to test the inverted control – on exactly the same
stimuli, procedure, and participant population as the upright
condition of interest – and hope for the best. Ideally, the exper-
iment will produce no composite effects for inverted faces: if
so, then the composite scores for upright faces can be taken
as a pure and direct measure of the strength of holistic face
coding. At the other extreme, the experiment might produce
a composite effect for inverted faces so large it is no less than
that for upright faces: if so, then the upright composite scores
will fail to index holistic coding at all – instead fully reflecting
secondary cognitive factor/s – and thus should not be inter-
preted theoretically (e.g., as arguing for other-race reductions
in holistic coding, or for weaker holistic coding strength in
prosopagnosics than controls). Finally, an intermediate result
may be obtained in which composite scores are quite clearly
smaller for inverted faces than for upright faces, but are still
significantly larger than zero. In this case, we would argue
that the upright composite scores derive partly from holistic
coding and partly from secondary cognitive factor/s and that
a purer measure of holistic coding might best be obtained
by subtracting the inverted composite scores away from the
upright scores.
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FIGURE 12 | Composite effects for top-half target conditions versus
bottom-half target conditions. Both for face identity composites (data
from Experiment 2) and face expression composites (Experiment 5), the
size of the composite effect is strongly sensitive to orientation when
participants respond to the top-half of the face (which contains the eyes),
but as large for inverted faces as for upright faces when participants
respond to the bottom-half of the face (when the eyes are in the
to-be-ignored half). Section “Brief Methods” for calculation of composite
effect score. Error bars show ±1 SEM. **p < 0.01.
In sum, there are two main take home messages from our
composite face experiments. First, researchers should use top-half
targets not bottom-half targets. (This is easy to implement for
identity composites, but more challenging for expression, where
certain expressions have always been presented as bottom-half tar-
gets due to the relative difficulty of identifying the expressions from
top halves even in isolation.) And second, even when using top-
half targets, researchers should always test the composite effect for
inverted faces. To illustrate that this genuinely matters, we note our
data from Experiments 1–5 contained at least two cases where an
incorrect theoretical conclusion would have been drawn if only
the upright condition data had been available. In Experiment
2, all faces happened to be male, and our upright data showed
a significantly larger composite effect for male observers than
female observers. However, the same pattern was present inverted
(Figure 11). This indicates it is not valid to conclude that the
upright results support an own- versus other-sex effect on holistic
coding (i.e., that men have stronger holistic coding for male faces
than do women). Similarly, in Experiment 3, our upright results
showed a larger composite effect in Caucasian observers than
Asian observers; but again this pattern was also present inverted
(Figure 9), indicating that it cannot be interpreted as evidence that
Caucasians have stronger holistic face coding than Asians.
Rejecting an alternative interpretation
An alternative view of our inverted composite results could be
that we should just “believe our results”: that is, we should take
without question that the composite effect scores provide direct
indications of the amount of holistic coding, and therefore con-
clude that holistic coding does sometimes occur for inverted faces,
and that the strength of this inverted holistic coding varies across
the conditions we have measured. We see two major problems
with this interpretation. First, it ignores the theoretical poten-
tial for secondary cognitive measures to contribute to the tasks.
It is a well-accepted principle in psychology that it is often dif-
ficult to obtain a pure experimental measure of an underlying
theoretical construct one wishes to tap (e.g., see discussions of
whether repetition priming tasks always provide pure measures of
implicit memory without explicit memory contamination; McK-
one and Slee, 1997) and, in the case of composite scores, we
have provided a solid theoretical basis to suspect that scores
could be influenced by secondary factors (e.g., attentional spot-
light size as influenced by global bias, eye attraction). Second,
and most importantly, the experimental results fail to converge
with observers’ everyday reports of the holistic coding illusions.
If we “just believed” the results for the top- versus bottom-half
target experiments (Figure 12), we would conclude that if in
Figure 7 we look at the bottom-half of the expression compos-
ites (i.e., right panels), that the illusion of expression changes
in the mouth region would be as strong for inverted as for
upright. Yet, in contrast, observers generally report no illusory
expression changes for the mouth half at all in the inverted orien-
tation. This is perhaps made even clearer in the Thatcher illusion,
where focusing on the mouth region of the inverted version
in Figure 1A does not produce an illusion of bizarre expres-
sion, as would be predicted if we believed our expression com-
posite scores for inverted bottom-half targets indicated holistic
coding.
PART 2: THE PART-WHOLE EFFECT
The part-whole method has been the other common method of
assessing holistic processing, used consistently from its original
inception (Tanaka and Farah, 1993) to the present day. As with
the composite effect, earlier studies tended to include the inverted
control condition, but later studies have generally dropped it (e.g.,
Michel et al., 2006a; DeGutis et al., 2013).
As with the composite effect, the part-whole effect relies on
the assumption that the score of interest – the advantage in the
whole condition over performance in the part condition – reflects
a pure measure of holistic face coding. If this is true in a given cir-
cumstance, then we would expect to observe a whole-over-part
advantage for upright faces (for which the underlying illusion
occurs, Figure 1) but no whole-over-part advantage for inverted
faces (for which the underlying illusion is absent). This is indeed
the pattern originally reported in Tanaka and Farah (1993), and
in other articles reviewed in Figure 3. However, we do not see that
this result is guaranteed. There is a theoretical possibility that sec-
ondary cognitive factor/s, beyond holistic coding, could contribute
to a part-whole effect.
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The primary issue here is not the spotlight of visual atten-
tion6. Instead, a more relevant secondary cognitive factor is
encoding-specificity (Tulving and Thompson, 1973), which refers
to the tendency for recognition to be better when the conditions
at retrieval match those at encoding (i.e., study-test match) than
when the retrieval conditions are different from those at encoding
(i.e., study-test mismatch). As noted by previous authors (Gauthier
and Tarr, 2002; Leder and Carbon, 2005), encoding-specificity has
the potential to produce a “false” part-whole effect – that is, an
advantage in the whole condition not arising from holistic coding –
because the study-test match is higher in the whole condition than
in the part condition. At study, participants learn whole faces (e.g.,
Bill’s face). At test, the whole condition again presents whole faces
(e.g., Bill’s nose in Bill’s face versus John’s nose in Bill’s face), giving
high overlap with learning, while the part condition presents a sin-
gle part of the face (e.g., Bill’s nose versus John’s nose), giving lower
overlap with learning. Consistent with the idea that encoding-
specificity can influence the part-whole task, Leder and Carbon
(2005) reversed the usual design and presented isolated parts at
learning: under these conditions, recognition at test was signifi-
cantly better in the part condition (which had higher study-test
overlap) than the whole condition (lower study-test overlap).
For this reason, testing the part-whole effect in the inverted ori-
entation provides an important control. As noted by Robbins and
McKone (2007), the fact that the amount of study-test match in the
inverted condition is equal to that in the upright condition means
that, if it is demonstrated in a particular experiment that there is no
part-whole effect inverted, then the presence of a part-whole effect
upright cannot be attributed to encoding-specificity (or alterna-
tive secondary factor/s) and must reflect holistic coding. However,
if a significant whole-over-part advantage is found for inverted,
then this argues for a general contribution of encoding-specificity
that would be expected to contribute to the upright “part-whole”
effect as well. Moreover, there is potential for the contribution
of encoding-specificity effects to vary across studies. Encoding-
specificity effects change with aging (Buschke et al., 1995), and it is
plausible they could also change with other participant properties
(e.g., brain injury; age in children) potentially in interaction with
stimulus parameters (e.g., line-drawn sketches versus photographs
of faces) and procedure parameters (e.g., study-test delay).
We now present a single experiment that demonstrates it is pos-
sible to obtain a large, significant, part-whole effect for inverted
faces. We do not present multiple experiments exploring the
aspects of design and/or participants that might have contributed
to this finding. Our primary aim is simply to make the point that
factors other than holistic processing can sometimes contribute to
the part-whole effect; and, that testing of the inverted control is
thus required to determine whether or not part-whole scores for
6Difficulties with narrowing the focus of spatial attention would not produce a false
part-whole effect because (a) no narrowing is required at learning (participants are
instructed to learn a whole face), (b) at test, no narrowing is required in the part
condition because the part is presented alone, and so (c) the only case where nar-
rowing is required is the whole condition at test, where the participant is required to
focus on a small region (e.g., the nose) within a larger total stimulus (i.e., the whole
face). Thus, any difficulties with narrowing attention would reduce performance in
the whole condition relative to the part condition; this would reduce the size of any
whole-over-part advantage, but not introduce a false whole-over-part advantage.
upright faces can be taken as direct measures of holistic coding
strength.
BRIEF METHOD
Experiment 6: part-whole effect for identity
A standard part-whole method was used in which participants
study a whole face, then subsequently choose a part from that face
(e.g., the mouth) from a new distractor (a different mouth), with
the parts shown either in isolation (part condition) or in the stud-
ied face (whole condition; Figure 4C). The measure was accuracy,
with chance being 50% in the 2AFC task. The part-whole effect
was measured as accuracy in the whole condition minus accu-
racy in the part condition. Upright and inverted versions of the
task were completed in counterbalanced order. We report data for
Caucasian participants (defined as in Experiments 1–5) tested on
own-race (Caucasian) faces, collapsed over all parts tested (eyes,
nose, mouth).
RESULTS
Figure 13 plots performance in the whole and part conditions,
for both upright and inverted faces. As expected, the experi-
ment produced a significant part-whole effect (advantage of whole
compared to part) for upright faces, t (30)= 2.960, p= 0.006.
The experiment also produced a significant part-whole effect for
inverted faces, t (30)= 4.546, p < 0.001. Moreover, the inverted
part-whole effect was so large that it trended toward being even
larger than the upright part-whole effect (M = 6.5% inverted,
M = 5.2% upright); this difference was not significant, with no
interaction between orientation and part versus whole condition,
F(1,30)= 0.394, MSE= 30.972, p= 0.535.
DISCUSSION
Results show that the part-whole task can, on occasion, produce
a large part-whole effect for inverted faces. Theoretically, a plau-
sible origin of this effect is a benefit of encoding-specificity in the
FIGURE 13 | Part-whole task results from Experiment 6. Findings show
large part-whole effect (advantage for whole compared to part) for inverted
faces. Error bars show ±1 SE of the difference scores, the appropriate error
bar for the within-participants comparison of whole with part. **p < 0.01.
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whole condition compared to the part condition (although other
secondary cognitive factors cannot be ruled out). As with the com-
posite effect, we do not claim to understand the exact participant
and/or design aspects that have led to the inverted part-whole
effect. For example, it remains unclear why encoding-specificity
might have played such a strong role in this particular experiment,
while other part-whole experiments using generally similar pro-
cedures and apparently similar participant groups have produced
much smaller or no part-whole effects for inverted faces (see review
in Figure 3). Again, however, our present aim is not to try to under-
stand the contributing factors, but rather simply to point out that:
(a) large inverted part-whole effects can happen; (b) when this
occurs, it argues that secondary cognitive factors have affected the
measure and thus that the upright scores are very likely to provide
an impure measure of holistic face coding; and (c) in the absence
of a complete understanding of contributing factors, testing of the
inverted control cannot be dropped. This conclusion is important
because, although earlier part-whole studies tended to include the
inverted condition as routine (e.g., see review in Figure 3), recent
papers have tended to test only upright (e.g., Michel et al., 2006a;
Herzmann et al., 2008; Mondloch et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012;
DeGutis et al., 2013).
CONCLUSION
Our aims in this article have been primarily methodological. We
have provided a discussion of cognitive factors other than holistic
face coding that could contribute to false composite and part-
whole effects. We have then demonstrated that such effects can
occur, reporting that both are sometimes found for inverted faces
despite the absence of the corresponding holistic coding illusions.
Our results argue that composite or part-whole scores for upright
faces can only be taken as theoretically informative regarding holis-
tic face coding if the inverted face control is tested and shown
to produce no (or at most a small) false effect. Our results also
suggest that the circumstances where significant false effects are
obtained for inverted faces are not simple to understand: these
seem likely to reflect a complex interaction of factors involving
properties of the participant, properties of the stimuli, and prop-
erties of the procedure. Finally, our results suggest that, while it
has long been accepted that secondary cognitive factors can some-
times contribute to the part-whole effect, that secondary cognitive
factors can also sometimes contribute to the composite effect; this
suggests that neither task is intrinsically stronger than the other
and instead that both tasks often produce pure measures of holistic
processing, but not always.
Our results have implications for both future research and the
interpretation of previously published findings. Unfortunately, all
these implications are rather unwelcome.
For future research, our conclusions imply that resources must
be devoted to testing the inverted control. That is, researchers can-
not rely on an assumption that, because inverted composite effects
and part-whole effects are often absent, that they will be absent in
all situations. In addition, testing of the inverted control needs to
use exactly the same design as upright, and either the same partici-
pants as tested in the upright condition, or participants matched as
closely as possible on multiple attributes: race, sex, age, brain injury
status, and plausibly other variables such as myopia or choice of
profession (both of which influence preferred size of attentional
spotlight, Doherty et al., 2008; McKone et al., 2008).
Regarding past studies, composite effects and part-whole effects
have been used to address a very wide range of theoretical ques-
tions about holistic coding in face perception. These include, for
example: whether the other-race effect can be attributed to lack of
holistic coding (e.g., Michel et al., 2006b); whether holistic cod-
ing emerges early in childhood (e.g., Carey and Diamond, 1994;
Tanaka et al., 1998; for review see McKone et al., 2012); whether
there are heritable contributions to holistic coding (twin studies;
Zhu et al., 2010); whether there is a critical period for holistic cod-
ing in infancy (Le Grand et al., 2004); whether impaired holistic
coding contributes to impaired face recognition in prosopagnosia
(e.g., Avidan et al., 2011); whether holistic coding is affected in
other disorders (e.g., William’s syndrome, Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2003); whether variation in holistic coding is associated with
normal-range individual differences in face recognition (Wang
et al., 2012; DeGutis et al., 2013); whether there are hemispheric
differences in holistic coding (Ramon and Rossion, 2012); the
shape of tuning functions of holistic coding with different types of
head rotation (McKone, 2008; Rossion and Boremanse, 2008); and
whether holistic coding for facial expression and identity tap same
or different stages of processing (Palermo et al., 2011). Validity of
the conclusions drawn from all such studies relies on the validity
of the techniques. In some of the studies, the inverted control
was tested with results indicating that the upright scores were
valid measures of holistic coding; in these cases, the theoretical
conclusions of the study are not impacted. In other cases, how-
ever, only upright was tested. This implies there is some question
over the theoretical conclusions drawn, and that the study may
need to be replicated with testing of both upright and inverted
orientations.
DETAILED METHODS
EXPERIMENT 1: IDENTITY COMPOSITE NAMING, WITH TYPICAL JOIN
The experimental stimuli (all male faces) and procedure were
exactly as described in Experiment 1 of McKone (2008); Figure 4B
shows examples of the specific stimuli used. For the present article,
participant numbers and demographics were as follows. Cau-
casians included the n= 20 described in McKone (2008, Experi-
ment 1) plus five added subsequently, for total n= 25 (21 females,
4 males). The Asians were new participants with total n= 64
(29 females, 35 males). For the Asian-Australians, total n= 25
(15 females, 10 males). Inverted composite scores for the Asian-
Australian participants were previously reported, at an individual-
subject level, in McKone et al. (2008). All participants were 18–
32 years. Asians and Caucasians were tested on the full procedure
described in Experiment 1 of McKone (2008), that is, upright and
inverted blocks in counterbalanced order (note there was no effect
of order on the size of the composite effect); within each block, par-
ticipants completed 60 trials using aligned faces and 60 trials using
misaligned faces in random order. The Asian-Australian group was
tested only on the inverted block. Error rates in the naming task
were less than 10% in all conditions for all participants and were
too low to analyze for composite effects. RTs for individual trials
were excluded if the response was incorrect or if the RT was less
than 250 ms or more than 3 SDs above the mean for that subject.
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 33 | 17
McKone et al. Holistic face coding inverted control
EXPERIMENT 2: IDENTITY COMPOSITE SAME-DIFFERENT, WITH
INVISIBLE JOIN
Twenty-four Asian (14 female, 10 male) and 24 Caucasian (14
female, 10 male) university students participated, aged 18–33 years
(M = 21, SD= 2.81). Each received $12 for the 1-h experiment.
Four within-subjects factors were crossed: race-of-face (Asian ver-
sus Caucasian), target half (top or “forehead”-half versus bottom
or “chin”-half), orientation of face (upright versus inverted), and
alignment of the halves (aligned versus misaligned). Race-of-face,
target half and orientation were blocked to create eight condi-
tions, e.g., “Asian-upright-forehead-target,” “Caucasian-inverted-
chin-target,” etc. Block order was counterbalanced across partic-
ipants. Within each block, participants completed 60 trials using
aligned faces and 60 trials using misaligned faces in random
order.
For Caucasian faces, in the top-half target condition, cre-
ation of stimuli and presentation procedure is described in Susilo
et al. (2011). Everything was the same for the Asian faces (from
Korean database, Intelligent Multimedia Lab, 2001), and for the
bottom-half target conditions. After the second composite on
each trial, the question was “Were the forehead halves same or
different?” (top-half blocks) or “Were the chin halves same or
different?” (bottom-half blocks). To make the “invisible” joins
in the stimuli (Figure 6), we digitally retouched the light and
shadows near the join on the non-target half (the target half
was unchanged), meaning retouching was done independently
for top-half target block stimuli and for bottom-half target block
stimuli.
EXPERIMENT 3: IDENTITY COMPOSITE SAME-DIFFERENT, USING
EXPERIMENT 2 STIMULI WITH ADDED GAP
This experiment was identical to Experiment 2 with the following
exceptions: only the top-half target (“forehead”halves) were tested,
in counterbalanced order across participants; and the stimuli were
edited to add a small gap between the two halves at the location
of the half-boundary, remove the hat, and remove the bound-
ary marker-lines. Size and appearance of the gap was designed to
match as closely as possible the appearance in stimuli of Michel
et al. (2006b). Example stimulus from this specific experiment is
shown in Figure 9 under “Experiment 3” heading.
Participants were 32 Asians (19 female, 13 male) and 32 Cau-
casians (19 female, 13 male). All were young adult (age 18–32)
university students, paid $15 per h or given course credit.
EXPERIMENT 4: IDENTITY COMPOSITE SAME-DIFFERENT, WITH
ROSSION-LAB GAP STIMULI
This experiment used the exact stimuli and procedure of Michel
et al. (2006b) in the upright orientation; and then repeated it
inverted. In all other experiments in the present article, partic-
ipants were tested individually. Here, however, testing was con-
ducted in groups of up to 20 simultaneously as part of an under-
graduate laboratory program. Given the group testing, we screened
the data files to delete a small number of participants who showed
clear evidence of non-attendance to the task (e.g., for the last half
of the trials, the participant simply pressed same button on all
trials). We restricted analysis to age 18–32 years, of the race cate-
gories of interest. RTs for individual trials were excluded if response
was incorrect or RT was longer than 2 s. Final participants were
22 Asians (21 female, 1 male) and 92 Caucasians (65 female, 27
male).
EXPERIMENT 5: EXPRESSION COMPOSITE SAME-DIFFERENT, WITH
INVISIBLE JOIN STIMULI
Participants and design
Face orientation was varied between-subjects. For upright faces,
there were 19 participants (11 females, 8 males) aged 18–30 years
(M = 21.16; SD= 3.72); for inverted faces 8 participants (all
female) 18–31 years (M = 23.25; SD= 5.5). Top-half and bottom-
half blocks were tested in counterbalanced order. (Inverted par-
ticipants also completed identity composites, in top-half target
only, and upright participants completed additional sizes to those
described; those data are not reported here.)
Participants were Caucasian (same race as face stimuli), had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received course credit
or $15 for the 1-h study. Most were Australian National University
students.
Stimuli
Expression stimuli were grayscale, front view. Base photographs
showed two people (one male,one female) each posing six different
expressions: anger, fear, sadness, happiness, disgust, and surprise.
Composite faces were made by combining the top-half of one
expression (which was always anger, fear, or sadness, i.e., expres-
sions well recognized from top-half faces in isolation) with the
bottom-half of the same person displaying a different expression
(happiness, surprise, or disgust, i.e., expressions well recognized
from bottom-half faces in isolation). This gave 18 aligned com-
posites (3 top expressions× 3 bottom expressions× 2 people). A
black ski cap was added to remove hair.
These composites were then organized into presentation pairs
(see Figure 7). For top-half target blocks, the top halves of the
two successive composites contained either same or different
expressions while the bottom halves always contained different
expressions. For bottom-half target blocks, it was the reverse.
There were 36 aligned trials per block, comprising 18 same-
target half pairs, and 18 different-target half pairs. Another 36
misaligned trials were created by taking the exact stimuli of the 36
aligned trials and making misaligned versions by shifting one half
to the left or right by half a face width (left and right shifts used
equally often; both pair members on a misaligned trial always
used the same direction of shift). This resulted in 72 trials (36
aligned trials, 36 misaligned trials) per block. Within the block,
order of aligned and misaligned trials was randomized for each
participant.
For the inverted condition, all stimuli were rotated 180˚. Data
come from eight blocks per orientation (a top- and a bottom-target
block for each of the four sizes). Visual angle was manipulated by a
combination of size of stimulus on the screen and observer-screen
distance (27 cm for 9.0˚ and 34.9˚, 200 cm for 1.3˚ and 2.1˚; vertical
visual angle from top-of-hat to bottom-of-chin).
Procedure
Stimuli were presented on an Macintosh 28′′ monitor resolution
2560× 1440, using SuperLab V4.5.2 software. Inter-trial-interval
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was 250 ms. Sequence on each trial was: first composite for 300 ms,
inter-stimulus interval of 250 ms, then the second composite pre-
sented until participant response. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible (“1” key for
“same” and “9” for “different ”). For each subject, trials with RTs
>3 SDs above the mean RT for that distance condition were
excluded.
EXPERIMENT 6: PART-WHOLE EFFECT FOR IDENTITY
Participants were 31 Caucasian students at the University
of Wollongong, Australia, 19 female, 12 male, age 17–34
(M = 21.9 years, SD= 4.1), who received course credit for the
half hour experiment. Test condition (part, whole), and ori-
entation (upright, inverted) were varied within-subjects. Order
of upright and inverted blocks was counterbalanced. Faces of
interest were Caucasian. (Asian faces were also tested, but data
are not reported because the upright composite effect was very
small, making size of the inverted composite effect difficult to
evaluate.)
Stimuli and procedure were as described in Crookes et al.
(2013). Figure 4C shows examples of the specific stimuli (Tanaka
et al., 2004).
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